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The U.S. Constitution is now 230 years old, and it is showing its age. Its text,
taken in the sense that its enactors understood it, is, unsurprisingly, inadequate to
the needs of a large, populous twenty-first century nation. The Constitution creates
a government hat is carefully insulated from the democratic preferences of the
population. It fails to vest the central government with the tools needed to manage
and regulate a vast, complicated, and interrelated society and economy. On the
other hand, it guarantees its citizens protection of only a limited set of human
rights. Notwithstanding these blatant defects, the means provided in the
constitutional text to change it, to improve it, are insufficient to make it
appropriate for current conditions. There is reason to be skeptical of studies
purporting to measure the difficulty of constitutional amendment procedures. But
combined with an inspection of the text and the history of amendment, this
research is persuasive and supports the claim that reliance on Article V's
procedures are unlikely to successfully reform the Constitution. On top of these
objective measures, moreover, constitutional revision in the United States is
hampered by a widely held, though uninformed, opinion that the current
Constitution is still protecting national welfare and that any change-any
tinkering-with the rules in that document bears a heavy burden of persuasion.
Reform by amendment, that is, appears to be a dead end. The U.S. judiciary,
however, has, in an important way, come to the rescue of a polity that would
otherwise be in a perpetual thrall to the principles of the eighteenth century. In
"interpreting" the Constitution, the courts have gone a long way to correct the
defects listed. But their "interpretations" have little relationship to the fixed rules
installed by the constitutional enactors. Judges have assumed what amounts to a
power of constitutional amendment. But such an amendment echnique is
irregular, unpredictable, and devoid of the sanction of the "people," past or
present, whose assent is usually thought essential to constitutional legitimacy. The
United States has escaped the disadvantages of an outdated Constitution but at the
price of subverting the constitutional rule of law.
* Oliver Ellsworth Research Professor and Wallace Stevens Professor Emeritus,
University of Connecticut School of Law.
Drake Law Review
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I. THE PROBLEM WITH THE CONSTITUTION
Does the U.S. Constitution need to be updated? Like all complicated
legal questions, the answer must be, "It depends." In this case, it depends,
among other things, on what we mean by the Constitution. I will relax this
assumption later, but in the first instance, I will stipulate a definition that is
consistent with the understanding of many ordinary citizens: The
Constitution is a set of rules formulated at certain historical moments by
identifiable individuals who, at the time, were perceived as having either
political (in the case of the original constitutional enactment) or legal (in the
case of amendments) attributes that made them suitable legislators of the
legal system's highest law. Insofar as the Constitution's current status is a
result of the choices made by these enactors, it is, in an essential sense, their
constitution. That is, it reflects their understanding of the society it was to
govern, their values, their insights, and their intelligence. And, by the same
token, it will also be defined by their limitations, including political
experience, moral judgment, and knowledge of the facts of the world. Since
the society to be governed by the Constitution was necessarily going to
change over time, it was inevitable that, sooner or later, the Constitution, so
understood, would become a clumsy, if not a perverse, instrument of
government.
The U.S. Constitution is, in many of its most important aspects, a very
old constitution. It has been amended but, remarkably, rarely.1 The critical
Reconstruction Amendments, for example, are now about 150 years old. In
these circumstances, only the most improbable good luck would have
obviated the need for significant revision. And we can, in fact, identify many
ways in which the Constitution has turned out to be inadequate to our
current situation. Again, by Constitution, I mean those rules that were
1. Richard S. Kay, Formal and Informal Amendment of the United States




intentionally created by the enactors in 1787-1789 and by the amending
authorities acting according to the procedures of Article V. Of course, that
is not the same thing as the rules that are attributed to the Constitution by
courts and other public actors. I will come back to the latter at the end of
this Article.
2
We might look at three broad areas that illustrate ways in which the
original text has become unsatisfactory. First, given current views about the
proper basis of political authority, the original constitutional machinery of
government now appears unjustifiably careless of the democratic
preferences of the governed population.3 The equal representation of states
in the Senate, notwithstanding vast differences in population, is one
example.4 That malapportionment, in turn, impairs the representative
capacity of the presidential election procedure, since a state's votes in the
Electoral College are determined by the size of its congressional delegation.5
Beyond this, the original text withdrew several important decisions from
simple majorities of the various legislative bodies.6 These decisions instead
require the agreement of some supermajority of the relevant body, thus
undemocratically empowering the dissenting minority. The sine qua non of
this technique is the procedure necessary to amend the Constitution,
something examined more closely below.
For the founders, the undemocratic character of the national
government was a feature, not a bug. They believed sensitivity to popular
opinion was an indispensable element in any republican government, but
they were also convinced that raw public preferences needed to be filtered
and refined by wiser and more careful statespersons.7 A significant number
of the Constitution's architects understood its structure exactly as "a cure for
the evils under which the [preconstitutional United States]
2. See infra Part IV.
3. For a thorough treatment, see generally SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR
UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND How
THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 25-78 (2006).
4. The House of Representatives suffers from a similar-if less egregious-
deficiency by virtue of the constitutional requirement that every state have at least one
representative. U.S. CONST. art I, § 2.
5. See id. art. II, § 1.
6. See, e.g., id. art. V.





laboured... [arising from] the turbulence and follies of democracy."8 Over
time, as the priority of democratic choice became more widely accepted,
U.S. political institutions were altered by law, practice, and constitutional
amendment to make them better mirrors of popular opinion. In this
environment, the remaining countermajoritarian aspects of the Constitution
have increasingly stood out as anomalies in need of correction.9
Second, the existing Constitution sets out what now appears to be an
unworkable division of power between the states and the federal
government. A strictly limited assignment of powers to the federal
government made sense when the normal activities of government were few
and technology and geography made it inevitable that the bulk of public
functions would be exercised at the state level. It was obvious to James
Madison during the ratification debates that the lion's share of governing
would-and ought to-belong to the states.10 These days there are varying
views about what the federal government ought to be able to do in our
complicated, variegated, technologically advanced, interconnected, and
geographically extended society. Almost no one, however, favors a central
government confined to the limited subject matters listed in Article I of the
Constitution.1
8. JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
WHICH FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 32-34
(Gaillard Hunt & James Brown Scott eds., 1920) (remarks of Edmund Randolph,
speaking specifically of the Senate).
9. Richard S. Kay, Democracy, Mixed Government and Judicial Review, in LAW
UNDER A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JEFFREY
GOLDSWORTHY 199, 206-10 (Lisa Burton Crawford, Patrick Emerton & Dale Smith
eds., 2019) [hereinafter Kay, Democracy].
10. As Madison explained:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government
are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are
numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external
objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the
power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected.
The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which,
in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of
the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.
THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Am. Bar Ass'n ed., 2009).
11. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Puppy Federalism and the Blessings of America,
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., Mar. 2001, at 37 (2001).
[Vol. 67890
Updating the Constitution
Lastly, most people today believe that an essential component of any
fair constitution is the protection of basic individual rights. The extent and
the scope of these rights are inevitably controversial. Although the original
U.S. Constitution as amended does include a number of important rights
provisions, it is reasonable to say that, honestly interpreted, it falls far short
of what most citizens think constitutional rights ought to protect.12 The most
extensive list, the first eight amendments, constrained only the federal
government, whereas now people tend to think every government ought to
be similarly controlled.13 The prohibitions on racial discrimination in the
Reconstruction Amendments do explicitly apply to the states, but they are
limited to fields of action far narrower than what the current moral
consensus requires.14 And other objectionable forms of discrimination, such
as those based on gender or sexual orientation, were omitted entirely. There
are, moreover, whole swathes of protection that non-U.S. jurisdictions have
determined are appropriate for protection that our original Constitution
makers never dreamed of.15
I could go on, but the point is clear enough. As originally conceived
and understood, the U.S. Constitution is grossly ill-suited for the jobs we
now expect a constitutional government to do. It bars the government from
taking those steps essential to the welfare of the population being governed,
while permitting the government to take actions that offend widely and
deeply held social values. That is hardly surprising since we live in a world
qualitatively and quantitatively foreign to the world the eighteenth-century
Constitution makers inhabited. What then can be done about the inevitable
problems of an old constitution?
12. See, e.g., EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES,
4-10 (2013).
13. See, e.g., Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
14. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.
15. In this respect it is enough to examine the very widely adopted international
human rights instruments. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. In fact, a cursory inspection of U.S.
state constitutions discloses scores of rights absent from the U.S. Constitution. See
ZACKIN, supra note 12, at 4-10.
2019]
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II. THE DIFFICULTY OF AMENDMENT
Although the constitutional enactors probably could not have foreseen
that their text would govern for more than 230 years, they did take into
account the inevitable need for "useful alterations.'16 They followed the
example of several of the state constitutions adopted at independence17 by
setting out a procedure for amendment in Article V.1 The deliberations at
the Philadelphia Convention reveal disagreements about the best method
for revision but none as to the desirability of including some procedure for
constitutional change.19 The Constitution makers also understood that the
necessity of revision had to be balanced against the risk that frequent change
would undermine the stability of constitutional rules that would be essential
if the benefits of constitutional government were to be realized.20
Madison warned in The Federalist No. 49 against too frequent
"recurrence to the people.' 21 That would deprive the Constitution of the
''veneration ... without which perhaps the wisest and freest governments
would not possess the requisite stability. ' 22 He expanded on this view in his
reply to Thomas Jefferson's suggestion that all laws, including a constitution,
ought to expire in 19 years; that is when the adopting eneration could no
longer be presumed to constitute the majority of those subject o them.
Madison worried that such "a Government[,] depending for its existence
beyond a fixed date[] on some positive and authentic intervention ...
[would] be too subject to the casualty and consequences of an actual
16. See THE FEDERALIST No. 43, supra note 10, at 249 (James Madison).
17. Of the 10 state constitutions adopted at independence, only 4 provided any
special procedure for amendment. GA. CONST. art. LXIII; MD. CONST. art. LIX; PA.
CONST. § 47; S.C. CONST. art. XLIV.
18. The Articles of Confederation had also contemplated the need for
modification, although that provision specified that no change would be made "unless
such alteration be agreed to in a congress of the united states and be afterwards
confirmed by the legislatures of every state." ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781,
art. XIII. In The Federalist No. 40, Madison cursorily dismissed an argument that the
adoption of the new Constitution required this unanimous consent. THE FEDERALIST
No. 40 (James Madison). The Articles' rule embodied the "absurdity of subjecting the
fate of twelve States to the perverseness or corruption of a thirteenth." THE FEDERALIST
No. 40, supra note 10, at 222 (James Madison).
19. Kay, Amendment, supra note 1, at 244.
20. See id. at 268.




interregnum.' '23 And, referring to ordinary statutes as well as constitutions,
he denounced "the uncertainty incident to such a state of things [that] would
on one side discourage the steady exertions of industry produced by
permanent laws, and on the other, give a disproportionate advantage to the
more, over the less, sagacious and interprizing part of the Society. ' 24 The
trick therefore, as Madison recognized when defending the Philadelphia
Convention's amendment formula, was to "guard[] equally against that
extreme facility, which would render the Constitution too mutable; and that
extreme difficulty, which might perpetuate its discovered faults.
25
Like much else in the original Constitution, the balance struck in
Article V has been disparaged. Recent criticism has, for the most part,
converged on the proposition that its requirements make amendment too
difficult, with the result being that it has become impossible to deal
adequately with the evermore urgent need for revision.26 Various studies
have been conducted comparing the rules for amendment of the U.S.
Constitution to the processes employed in other jurisdictions, including both
foreign nations and U.S. states.27 Whatever differences these studies exhibit,
they all conclude the Article V criteria are the most--or almost the most-
difficult to satisfy.28 This quality is sometimes cited as explaining the fact
that, despite being one of the world's oldest written constitutions, the U.S.
Constitution has been so infrequently amended.
29




25. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, supra note 10, at 278 (James Madison).
26. Joseph R. Long, Tinkering with the Constitution, 24 YALE L.J. 573, 576 (1915);
Richard Albert, America's Unamendable Constitution, CATO UNBOUND (Dec. 11,
2015), https://www.cato-unbound.org/2015/12/11/richard-albert/americas-unamendable-
constitution [https://perma.cc/MQ3W-JFXF] [hereinafter Albert, Unamendable
Constitution].
27. See Richard Albert, Constructive Unamendability in Canada and the United
States, 67 Sup. CT. L. REv. (2d) 181, 182 (2014) [hereinafter Albert, Canada and the
United States].
28. Kay, Amendment, supra note 1, at 248 n.37.
29. There have been 28 amendments, but as the first 10 amendments were approved
more or less simultaneously, we can say the Constitution has been amended only 18
times. Comparative analyses of constitutional-amendment experiences often call for
examining not the absolute number of amendments of a given constitution but an
amendment rate, taking into account the years of a constitution's existence. See Jonathan
2019] 893
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Whether the United States' process is too difficult, of course, depends
on one's estimate of the relative importance of stability and adaptability in
the law generally and in constitutional law in particular. It is reasonable to
argue that he very point of a constitution is ordinarily to frustrate the desire
to "improve" the legal system, at least insofar as it touches on certain
especially sensitive areas of human activity.30 Efforts to compare the
difficulty of various amendment formulas, moreover, encounter apparently
insurmountable problems of incommensurability. Is it harder to secure a
three-fourths majority in a legislature or two-thirds majorities in consecutive
legislatures?31 Evidence provided by the history of U.S. constitutional
amendment is at best equivocal. It consists of relatively concentrated periods
of amendment activity (four amendments were added in the seven years
from 1913 to 1920), along with extended periods with no amendments. (We
are currently in what is effectively a 48-year amendment drought.)
3 2
Admitting these difficulties, however, need not preclude us from
deciding that, at least in the short and medium terms, the obstacles to U.S.
constitutional reform are unjustifiably steep. The Constitution makers
believed they were ensuring a certain level of caution before potentially
dangerous changes could be introduced in the basic rules of the polity.3 3 But
changes in underlying social and political facts have made these same
procedural steps harder to effect, converting a deliberate process into a near
impossible one.34 For reasons to be discussed, our current situation may have
made utilization of the Article V procedure especially difficult.35 To use
Richard Albert's phrase, we may have entered an era of "constructive
unamendability.
36
Marshfield, The Amendment Effect, 98 B.U. L. REV. 55, 81 n.145 (2018) (citing
authorities).
30. See Richard S. Kay, American Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM:
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 16, 22-25 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998) [hereinafter Kay,
Constitutionalism].
31. See Marshfield, supra note 29, at 79-80.
32. See Kay, Amendment, supra note 1, at 249-50 (summarizing the chronology of
amendment adoption). I omit, as sui generis, the Twenty-Seventh Amendment declared
ratified in 1992. Its approval by state legislatures stretched over 200 years. See id. at 259.
33. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 23.
34. See Albert, Canada and the United States, supra note 27, at 191; Albert,
Unamendable Constitution, supra note 26.
35. See Albert, Canada nd the United States, supra note 27, at 191.
36. Id. at 182. I agree with Albert that this kind of contingent incapacity is even
more pronounced in Canada, although for reasons somewhat different than those
underlying the U.S. amendment culture. Albert, Unamendable Constitution, supra note
[Vol. 67894
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There are some obvious causes. First is the simple enlargement of the
state. The Article V process requires supermajorities in Congress and among
state legislatures.3 7 With the growth of both the total population and the
number of states, these supermajorities have become harder to assemble.
38
The agreement of 44 members of the House of Representatives was
necessary to propose amendments in 1789.39 Now, 290 must agree.4° The
number of state legislatures that must assent has grown from 10 to 38.
41
When we factor in the vast disparity in state populations, it is clear that even
a powerful consensus for constitutional change in the national population
may be insufficient to secure an amendment's adoption. At the extreme, the
legislatures of states with only 5 percent of the population can block
an amendment desired by the representatives of the other 95 percent.42 The
26. Some scholars have argued that U.S. law provides ways to change the Constitution
without invoking the Article V machinery. I discuss the utility of judicial updating below.
See infra notes 100-31 and accompanying text. In an ambitious project, Bruce Ackerman
has posited the existence of "constitutional moments," where a society is intensively
engaged in a reconsideration of basic postulates of the constitutional order. Ackerman's
thesis has been presented in detail in a multivolume series. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE
THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS]; 2 BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE
THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014). It has elicited numerous
challenges. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, The Ghost of Liberalism Past, 105 HARV. L. REV.
918 (1992). Akhil Amar has contended the Constitution permits its amendment by a
national referendum. Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the
Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. Cm. L. REV. 1043, 1044 (1988). Amar's theory is
criticized in Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and
Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121,122 (1996).
37. U.S. CONST. art. V.
38. See Kay, Amendment, supra note 1, at 267.
39. See id. at 244; Apportionment of the U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/prod!3/98pubs/CPH-2-US.PDF [perma.cc/9PPA-
HNZ4].
40. See Kay, Amendment, supra note 1, at 244; Apportionment of the U.S. House of
Representatives, supra note 39.
41. Kay, Amendment, supra note 1, at 259.
42. Id. at 267 (describing the failure of the Equal Rights Amendment in the 1970s).
However, as Vicki Jackson has pointed out, only 6 of the 33 proposed amendments have
failed to be ratified, indicating the greater difficulty may be congressional proposal, not
state ratification. Vicki C. Jackson, The (Myth of Un)Amendablity of the US Constitution




consequences of this empowerment of a distinct and disaffected minority
have, if anything, been intensified by the increasing partisan rancor of recent
decades. Adherents of particular political views increasingly inhabit opinion
silos where their positions are more likely to be reinforced than to be
challenged. That is, it has become harder and harder to find common ground
or reach political compromise.43 More disagreement means fewer
amendments.
III. THE DANGERS OF "TINKERING"
Even if the intrinsic difficulty of amendment were less challenging than
it is usually agreed to be, it would still, in our current situation, face
formidable obstacles. That is because any proposed constitutional change
confronts a presumption that it poses serious legal and political risks.
44
Studies of relative amendment flexibility have increasingly recognized the
importance of these qualitative factors under the caption of "amendment
culture. ' 45 The evaluation of such a culture presents obvious problems of
measurement. Tom Ginsburg and James Melton have attempted to
"operationalize amendment culture as the rate at which a country's previous
constitution was amended" and concluded that, so measured, it was a better
predictor of subsequent amendment rates than the formal attributes of the
procedure. 46 There is good reason to think that the current amendment
culture in the United States exhibits a decided reluctance to change the
Constitution. The clearest evidence of this attitude is the pronounced
anxiety that appears whenever we get close to reaching the number of state
43. See Jennifer McCoy & Murat Somer, Toward a Theory of Pernicious
Polarization and How It Harms Democracies: Comparative Evidence and Possible
Remedies, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI., Jan. 2019, at 234-36.
44. See Bjorn Erik Rasch & Roger D. Congleton, Amendment Procedures and
Constitutional Stability, in DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND PUBLIC POLICY:
ANALYSIS AND EVIDENCE 319, 331 (Roger D. Congleton & Birgitta Swedenborg eds.,
2006).
45. Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, Does the Constitutional Amendment Rule
Matter at All? Amendment Cultures and the Challenges of Measuring Amendment
Difficulty, 13 INT'L J. CONST. L. 686, 687-88 (2015); see also Rasch & Congleton, supra
note 44, at 338; see generally Xenophon Contiades & Alkmene Fotiadou, Review Essay,
The Determinants of Constitutional Amendablity: Amendment Models or Amendment
Culture?, 12 EUR. CONST. L. REv. 192 (2016).
46. Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 45, at 708-11 (emphasis added). The United
States, with only one constitution, was therefore omitted from this study.
[Vol. 67896
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legislatures necessary to approve a national constitutional convention47 in
light of worries about the extent of the changes such a convention might
propose.48
The fear that any constitutional reform is likely to make things worse
has a long history. The original ratification of the Constitution was closely
contested and spawned "bitter disagreement of great ideological depth.
49
Despite this inauspicious beginning, the Constitution's authority was
promptly accepted on all sides.50 Its former Anti-Federalist opponents, in
fact, were soon citing "the strict words of this frail Constitution, insisting on
a literal interpretation of a document that many of them had vilified on
fundamental grounds.' 51 The historian, Lance Banning, explained that the
generation of the Constitution makers, steeped in classical republican
thought, held a deep attachment to a mixed or balanced government.
Maintaining such a government demanded an "unremitting attention to the
stability of the state.' 52 "According to their favorite histories of England and
of Rome, constitutional change, like water, always flowed downhill."53 In
light of these fears, the Constitution began to look better, even to those who
had been its vigorous opponents. These beliefs set the stage for what
Banning described as "constitutional apotheosis.'54 Even the disagreements
that led to the great crisis of disunion in the mid-nineteenth century were not
about the merits of the Constitution. Southern statespersons  the brink of
secession continued to cite the Constitution in their defense.55
47. Id. at 700.
48. While provided for in Article V, such a body has never been successfully called
into existence. The worry over a convention often is founded on the possibility that,
feeling the extraordinary power of a national sovereign people, it might turn "runaway,"
scrapping the Constitution wholesale. Ironically, the most persuasive precedent for such
a result is the Philadelphia Constitution of 1787. See Richard S. Kay, The Illegality of the
Constitution, 4 CONST. COMMENT. 57, 57-58 (1987).
49. Lance Banning, Republican Ideology and the Triumph of the Constitution, 1789
to 1793, 31 WM. & MARY Q. 167, 170, 176-79 (1974).
50. Id. at 167-68.
51. Id. at 172.
52. Id. at 174.
53. Id. at 177.
54. Id. at 167-68, 172-74, 177-79.




The prospects of amendment cannot be evaluated without taking into
account the continued existence of U.S. "Constitution worship. '5 6 This
attitude naturally discourages any attempts to improve or replace the
original text.57 When the National Constitution Center's website posted the
video of a debate on the propriety of a national amendment convention, it
introduced the subject by noting, "[I]t is always tempting to invoke Article
V to amend the Constitution-to 'fix' it, or 'restore' it, or 'improve' it. But,
on the other hand, there is a substantial risk to tinkering with the
Constitution: many amendments eem to have unintended consequences.
'58
Worries about "tinkering with the Constitution" come up whenever
constitutional revision is suggested.59 That description connotes something
trivial, something to be contrasted with the solemn majesty of the
Constitution. In 1915, an article with that title, by Joseph R. Long, was
published in the Yale Law Journal.6° Long criticized a proposal to amend
Article V to make the adoption of new amendments easier.61 The recent
approval of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Amendments, he argued, belied
the claim that amendment was near impossible.62 But mainly, like Madison,
he worried that too many revisions would "impair the dignity of a
constitution.' 63 The substantive reforms motivating many proposed
amendments would be better accomplished by federal or state legislation.
64
56. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FArrH 9-15 (1988).
57. See id. at 14-15.




60. Long, supra note 26.
61. Id. at 581.
62. Id. at 587.
63. Id. at 581. Long contrasted the rare amendment of the U.S. Constitution with
the easy and frequent amendment of state constitutions. "No one now entertains any
particular respect for a state constitution." Id. at 580.
64. Id. at 578. Among the reforms Long mentioned were women's suffrage and
prohibition. Amendments dealing with both of these topics were then being seriously
promoted and would shortly be adopted as the Eighteenth and Nineteenth
Amendments. Id. at 583. Long's constitutional concerns may be inferred from his
assertion that a women's suffrage amendment was undesirable given that "the suffrage
question in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were not so successful as to invite
other adventures in that field. The practical nullification of these provisions meets with
general satisfaction, and their formal repeal has more than once been proposed." Id. at
583-84. Among his reasons for opposing an amendment giving Congress the power to
[Vol. 67
Updating the Constitution
The Constitution, he conceded, "is not perfect," but a careful and deliberate
process was essential before altering a document that "is justly regarded as
the greatest instrument of government ever ordained by man.
65
A more recent illustration of the same phenomenon is the response to
efforts to procure a constitutional amendment giving Congress the power to
punish desecration of the United States' flag. These proposals were seriously
mooted in the wake of decisions by the Supreme Court, holding that
prosecutions for flag defilement were prohibited by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.66 Many people considered disrespect for the flag to be a grave
offense, and opinion polls showed a fairly consistent majority favoring
criminal prosecution.67 Opponents of such a constitutional amendment,
however, were able to mount effective arguments exactly along the lines
discussed.68 That is, they did not stress the rightness of constitutional
protection for flag burners. Instead, they emphasized the dangers of toying
with the Constitution and especially with the Bill of Rights.69 A 1990 opinion
column in Newsweek magazine reminded readers of the history of frivolous
attempts to "retrofit the Constitution" and quoted a Democratic
congressman's warning: "The country ought to be very anxious about doing
open-heart surgery on the First Amendment .... "70 A constitutional
amendment on this point was introduced in every Congress from 1995
through 2006, and it passed the House of Representatives with the necessary
two-thirds majority six times.71 It also easily won majorities in three Senate
legislate on marriage and divorce was his fear that Congress might force southern states
to permit interracial marriage. Id. at 585. Long was on the faculty of the Washington &
Lee University Law School and would shortly become its dean. Law School Notes, 16
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 212,212 (1959).
65. Long, supra note 26, at 581, 589.
66. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 404, 418 (1989).
67. Poll results taken in 2006 are collected at Law and Civil Liberties, POLLING
REP., http://www.pollingreport.com/law.htm [https://perma.cc/2YWU-26QL].





71. H.R.J. Res. 10, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R.J. Res. 4, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R.J.
Res. 36, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R.J. Res. 33, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R.J. Res. 54, 105th
Cong. (1998); H.R.J. Res. 79, 104th Cong. (1995).
2019]
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votes but narrowly failed the needed supermajority on each occasion.72 The
last time, in 2006, it failed by one vote.73 Among those voting no was
Kentucky Republican Senator, Mitch McConnell.74 Explaining his position
in an opinion column, he assured readers he did not "share the slightest
shred of sympathy with any who would dare desecrate the flag.... They
deserve rebuke and condemnation, if not a punch in the nose." But "[n]o act
of speech is so obnoxious that it merits tampering with our First
Amendment.
"17
There is little indication that U.S. attitudes toward the Constitution
and, derivatively, the danger of constitutional amendment is moderating.
76
Take the creation of the National Constitution Center. A 1988 act of
Congress provided for the creation of a center, headquartered in
Philadelphia, to undertake educational activities intended "to increase the
awareness and understanding of the Constitution among the American
people.'77 In 2003, a 160,000 square foot museum and visitors' center,
designed by Pei Cobb Freed & Partners and costing $137 million of public
and private funds, opened a short distance from Independence Hall.
78
Visitors attend performances of "Freedom Rising, [a] 17-minute 360-degree
live theatrical production that ells the story of the U.S. Constitution and the
American quest for freedom.'79 Numerous exhibits attempt to explain both
the history of the Constitution and the operation of the institutions it
created.80 The center's reverential attitude toward the Constitution is
72. S.J. Res. 12, 109th Cong. (2006); S.J. Res. 14, 106th Cong. (2000); S.J. Res. 31,
104th Cong. (1995).
73. S.J. Res. 12.
74. Mitch McConnell, Column by Mitch McConnell on Opposing the Flag
Desecration Amendment, VOTESMART (June 26, 2006), https://votesmart.org/public-
statement/184925/column-by-senator-mitch-mcconnel-on-passing-the-fag-desecration-
amendment [https://perma.cc/RPF9-VWXQ].
75. Id. On the relation between constitutional veneration and the difficulty of
amendment, see Albert, Unamendable Constitution, supra note 26.
76. See Albert, Canada nd the United States, supra note 27, at 195.
77. Constitution Heritage Act of 1988 § 3(a), 16 U.S.C. § 407bb (2018).
78. Witold Rybczynski, Architecture Review; More Perfect Union of Function and
Form, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/08/arts/architecture-
review-more-perfect-union-of-function-and-form.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm [https
://perma.cc/4T63-ZYZD].






evident in its exhibitions as well as in the supersized reproduction of the
Preamble on its outer wall.81 Its website confirms the center is devoted to the
"greatest vision of human freedom in our history, the U.S. Constitution."2
IV. REINTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONAL RULES
To this point, we have assumed that the Constitution that needs
updating is the set of rules formulated and approved in 1787-1789 by the
founders, specific people whose names we know or could find out. And by
constitutional amendment, we have referred to overt and formal invocations
of the method of revision that those original rules set forth in Article V.
While that is a fairly accurate description of most people's understanding,
more careful observers know that the reality is quite different. The effective
constitution, the set of rules that are enforced in the name of the
Constitution, often exhibits only the most attenuated connection to the rules
created in 1789 or the various amendments.83 In practice, most
"constitutional" rules are legislated by courts-especially the U.S. Supreme
Court-in the course of deciding cases that invoke the Constitution as
governing law. They are, that is, "interpretations" of the Constitution, even
though a candid evaluation would conclude they are in no way necessary
implications from the historical rules. To the extent these new rules are
effective, it is not unfair to think of them as "amendments" to the
constitutional text.84
To a considerable extent, these "amendments" have responded to the
kinds of defects in the original Constitution that I canvassed in the opening
paragraphs of this Article.85 To give just two of many examples, the limited
legislative reach of the federal government has been radically extended by,
among other things, an elastic reading of the Constitution's grant of
congressional power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
81. Id.
82. Mission & History, NAT'L CONST. CTR., https://constitutioncenter.org/
about/mission-history [perma.cc/B6UF-V4RE].
83. See generally Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Amendments and the
Constitutional Common Law, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF
LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 229, 231-34 (Richard W. Bauman &
Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006).
84. Id. at 247, 260-61.
85. See supra Part I.
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among the several States."86 Similarly, these new judicially created rules
respond to modern sensitivities about unjust discrimination. So, in the course
of interpreting the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the courts have
forbidden discrimination on grounds believed unexceptional at the time
these rules were ratified. Likewise, they have condemned unequal treatment
in connection with activities beyond the scope of regulation the original
enactors had in mind.87 This kind of constitutional revision has not only been
noticed by scholars but has been defended as superior to the Article V
technique, not least because of its superior capacity to respond promptly and
accurately to the changing facts and needs of society.88
While it is, in some ways, fortunate that judges have come to the rescue
of the outdated rules of the original text, this solution to the dilemma created
by the practical unamendablity of the Constitution comes at a price.89 The
legitimacy of the constitutional rules promulgated by judges is necessarily
doubtful in a state supposedly founded on the ultimate authority of "the
people."9 Justices of the Supreme Court are appointed for life and are
deliberately insulated from the influence of public opinion.91 In fact, given
the critical importance of constitutional rules, most observers conclude their
promulgation should be committed to a particularly pure and authentic
method of popular approval.92 The supermajorities required by the rules of
Article V are probably intended to replicate roughly the extraordinary
popular process that created the Constitution in the first place.
There is another important objection to the judicial creation of
constitutional rules. It means the content of the Constitution may be always
changing.93 The pace and content of that change, moreover, depends on
86. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
87. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 77-80 (Geoffrey R. Stone ed.,
2010).
88. See, e.g., id. at 33-50.
89. See Richard S. Kay, Constitutional Chrononomy, 13 RATIO JURIS 31, 44 (2000)
[hereinafter Kay, Chrononomy].
90. This is true notwithstanding the fact that a clear-eyed evaluation of the process
followed in 1787-1789 may seem more than a little deficient to express the will of the
American people, at least when judged by twenty-first century standards. Nevertheless,
regard for the Constitution as the authentic act of We the People appears to be
ineradicably entrenched in national consciousness. See id.
91. See id.
92. Richard S. Kay, Constituent Authority, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 715, 748-58 (2011).
93. See Kay, Amendment, supra note 1, at 265.
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numerous unpredictable decisions-by individuals to initiate litigation, by
the actions of lower courts, by the decisions of the justices of the Supreme
Court, and, of course, by the nomination and confirmation of those justices
by the President and the Senate.94 The cumulative result of these unknowns
is a process deeply inconsistent with the central idea behind
constitutionalism.95 The peculiar innovation that written constitutions were
supposed to have introduced into legal and political systems was the control
of public power by prior fixed law. Constitutions do not just reduce the reach
of the state; they do so by creating limits that are stable and are therefore
knowable in advance by those subject to the relevant government. This
allows individuals and private associations to plan their activities, knowing
in advance which are at risk and which are immune from state interference.96
This security is the central value of a "rule of law society," one responding
to the evil that Coke identified when he said that it was a "miserable slavery
to live under a vague or uncertain jurisprudence.'" 97 Here again, judicial
"amendment" that is both unpredictable and retrospective may be
contrasted with the Article V procedure. Amendments issuing from the
latter machinery go into effect only after a protracted legislative process and
then only prospectively.98
Judicial updating of the written Constitution may have yet another
unwelcome effect. Advocates for constitutional reform may find it easier to
pursue their projects through litigation than through attempting to work the
cumbersome machinery of Article V. To the extent they are successful, they
set an example for others that can further marginalize the process of formal
amendment. A standard example of this is the failed ratification of the Equal
Rights Amendment (ERA), which would have provided the following:
"Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
94. See id.
95. See Wil Waluchow, Constitutionalism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Dec. 20,
2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/constitutionalism/ [https://perma.cc/CN9F-
RM8U].
96. See Kay, Constitutionalism, supra note 30, at 22-24.
97. EDWARD COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND (1797), reprinted in 5B HISTORICAL WRITINGS IN LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE
2, 246 (1986) ("[M]isera est servitus, ubi jus est vagum, aut incognitum."); see Kay,
Constitutionalism, supra note 30, at 22-24.
98. See Richard S. Kay, Judicial Policy-Making and the Peculiar Function of Law,
26 U. QUEENSL. L.J. 237, 251-54 (2007).
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United States or by any state on account of sex."99 The amendment was
proposed in Congress by large majorities in both houses. The ratification
effort, however, stalled at 3 votes short of the necessary 38. In 1978, Congress
extended the 7-year deadline originally set for the amendment by another 3
years, but when that period expired in 1982, no additional ratifications had
occurred.100 Meanwhile, in the 10 years following its congressional proposal,
many of the substantive results that proponents had hoped the amendment
would guarantee were decided by the Supreme Court to be already
protected by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
101
This experience may be looked at in two ways. On the one hand, the social
movement that gave rise to the proposed amendment simply manifested
itself in a different way that was equally effective.10 2 Alternatively, the
successful pursuit of judicially managed constitutional reform took the steam
out of the ratification movement, assuring the proposed amendment's
failure.103 More generally, some commentators have argued the judiciary's
seizure of the process of constitutional revision bears much of the
responsibility for the atrophy of the Article V technique of constitutional
change.104
V. CONCLUSION
Our constitutional system therefore is afflicted with a serious internal
contradiction. The ultimate limits of public action are determined by judges
in an ongoing and unpredictable process.105 At the same time, the public
justification for those limits is founded on their supposed derivation from
the original rules of the Constitution as amended, rules that are, in fact,
99. Equal Rights Amendment, ERA, equalrightsamendment.org [https://
perma.cc/2S4K-4NGG].
100. See Kay, Amendment, supra note 1, at 258, 267.
101. David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L.
REv. 1457, 1476-78 (2001).
102. See id. at 1476 (stating the amendment was "rejected, yet ultimately
triumphant").
103. Id. at 1477-78.
104. John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good
Constitution, 98 GEO. L. J. 1693, 1728 (2010) (noting the Supreme Court's "attempts to
judicially enact amendments that have frustrated the proper working of the amendment
process"). By the same token, some commentators have suggested that the rigidity of
Article V is a cause of the untethered constitutional interpretation by U.S. courts. For a
critical examination of that claim, see generally Marshfield, supra note 29.
105. See Kay, Constitutionalism, supra note 30, at 24.
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largely inconsistent with the practical needs and the moral values of a
twenty-first century society.1°6 It is possible, however, to exaggerate the
difficulties arising from this situation. In practice, we have ended up with a
kind of "mixed government."107 The great bulk of its decisions are driven by
institutions that are, at least in the long and medium terms, answerable to
popular opinion.108 Those decisions are then reviewable by unelected judges
who measure them not against abstract fixed rules but against their own
understanding of appropriate political and social principles.1°9 Given the
increasingly political character of the selection and confirmation of judges,
however, their decisions are unlikely, over the long run, to depart very much
from widely held collective values.110
This is not an unattractive setup, but for reasons I have outlined above,
it is not a constitutional state, one bound by the rule of law. It is true that the
need for coordination among its constituent parts may end up reducing the
sum total of the activities such a state undertakes, but there are no limits to
what it might do if sufficient cooperation were achieved."' In the context of
the United States, moreover, these arrangements are particularly
problematic. That is because, as shown, the unavailability of formal
amendment is, in large part, a consequence of exaggerated regard for the
1789 Constitution as amended."2 It would not do for the judiciary to adopt
openly the policy role described. In fact, the Supreme Court always explains
even its most creative judgments by first invoking one or more provisions of
the constitutional text and then declaring the supposed consistency or
inconsistency of the challenged action with those provisions. "The way an
institution advertises tells you what it thinks its customers demand.""'
It would not be unreasonable to think that this tension between what
the courts do and what they say they do cannot be maintained indefinitely.
106. See generally id. at 24-25.
107. See Kay, Democracy, supra note 9, at 220-26.
108. See id. at 222.
109. See generally Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme
Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957).
110. Id. at 285.
111. Richard S. Kay, Substance and Structure as Constitutional Protections:
Centennial Comparisons, PUB. L., Autumn 2019, at 428.
112. LEVINSON, supra note 56, at 14-15.
113. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1, 4 (1971).
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Its continuation depends on the general failure of society to grasp the real
facts of the situation. The movement promoting "originalist" constitutional
interpretation, insofar as it insists on a demonstrable connection between
judicial decisions and the original constitutional rules,114 may be understood
as one reaction to the resulting incongruity. An honest originalist
jurisprudence, however, would quickly produce results that were themselves
practically unworkable or were offensive to an unacceptably large part of
the population.
Two things might resolve the difficulty. Popular dissatisfaction with
existing rules, textual or judicial, may become sufficiently widespread to
overcome the reluctance to tinker with the Constitution, and an extensive
set of amendments could be adopted.'15 As described, this has happened
before.116 If, however, a minority exploits the stringent requirements of
Article V to thwart that reform, a sufficiently determined and energized
majority might simply abandon what would appear to them, quite
reasonably, as a failed constitution and set in motion the establishment of an
explicitly new legal regime. This too has happened before-notably in
1787-1789.117
114. See Aaron Blake, Neil Gorsuch, Antonin Scalia and Originalism, Explained,
WASH. POST (Feb. 1, 2017), washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/02/01/neil-
gorsuch-antonin-scalia-and-originalism-explained/ [https:Hlperma.cc/688D-E4X9].
115. The amendments necessary to make the original text adequate to the needs of
a modern economy and conformable to evolved social values would work fairly radical
changes on the existing institutions, raising the question of whether these revisions could
fairly qualify as Article V amendments. These days many national constitutions contain
explicit limits on the reach of amendments. Others distinguish between modest changes
that may be the subject of amendment and revisions or replacements that require a more
rigorous procedure. And, texts aside, some courts have held amendments that alter the
core identity of a constitution to be ineffective. For a thorough discussion see generally
YANIv RoZNAI, UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: THE LIMITS OF
AMENDMENT POWER (2017). The sparse U.S. constitutional jurisprudence on the subject
has uniformly rejected this kind of argument. See, e.g., United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S.
716 (1931).
116. See, e.g., Kay, Amendment, supra note 1, at 249-50.
117. See Kay, Chrononomy, supra note 89, at 45-47. In The Federalist No. 40,
Madison noted that the members of the Philadelphia Convention:
must have reflected, that in all great changes of established governments, forms
ought to give way to substance; that a rigid adherence in such cases to the
former, would render nominal and nugatory the transcendent and precious right
of the people to "abolish or alter their governments as to them shall seem most
likely to effect their safety and happiness"....
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Either course of action would bring into alignment the nominal and the
actual practice of our government. But the political reality is that neither of
these developments is a reasonable prospect in the foreseeable future. There
are few indications that the factors preventing constitutional amendment
have in any way weakened. Those same factors militate at least as strongly
against the kind of coup pulled off by the eighteenth-century founders. The
alternative is the indefinite continuation of what we have now: a mixed
government with the aristocratic element performed-but also disguised-
by judges. It is satisfactory in many ways, but it is not the legal system the
founders had in mind when they declared themselves committed to a
"government of laws and not men."'118
THE FEDERALIST No. 40, supra note 10, at 224 (James Madison) (quoting the
Declaration of Independence).
118. MASS. CONST. art. XXX.
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